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Abstract 
This article proposes an agency model to explain the trade credit offer to clients. Our 
model is based on the existence of asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, which 
results in the appearance of two phenomena known as adverse selection and moral hazard. 
The former has already been explored by other authors, but not the latter, i.e., the possibility 
of the buyer not paying the provider. The results obtained indicate that days of sales 
outstanding of firms are positively related to adverse selection and negatively related to moral 
hazard. In order to test the moral hazard hypothesis, we use three variables: variable cost, 
demand elasticity and bad debts. Variable cost and demand elasticity present the expected 
relation, but bad debts only presents the negative expected relation at low levels, which 
suggests that when a firm presents high levels of bad debts the risk of the portfolio of clients 
is also high. In this case, the clients are more likely to present a low liquidity situation and 
consequently do not take advantage of the use of cash discounts.  Traditional models are also 
tested and compared with the proposed model. We did not find evidence to support tax theory 
or to support the operational argument of transaction cost theory. We find weak evidence to 
support the liquidity theory, while the asymmetric information theory was confirmed. A 
comparison between the agency model proposed and traditional models concluded that the 
Agency model reached better results in the explanation of the subject of study. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Trade credit is a very important source of financing for companies. 
Although it is an old practice, it is not completely understood. Numerous 
theories have been proposed to explain its existence and use, but none of them 
can provide a complete explanation of the topic. While some of the models are 
more consistent in the case of certain industries or categories of products others 
work better in a financially constrained environment. 
Four types of explanation can be enumerated as follows: a model based on 
transactions costs arguments was proposed by Schwartz (1974); financial 
models were first suggested by Emery (1984); a tax based model was suggested 
by Brick and Fung (1984); and an asymmetric information model was suggested 
by Smith (1987). 
This paper focuses on explaining trade credit proposing an agency model, 
based on the agency problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976). We 
consider the relation between a firm and its clients an agency relation from 
which two observable facts arise: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse 
selection happens when there is ex-ante asymmetric information between buyers 
and sellers. In this case buyers do not know ex-ante the characteristics and 
quality of the goods that are being acquired. The moral hazard is the possibility 
of clients not paying, since there is ex-post asymmetric information. 
Using a sample of UK manufacturing firms, we test the proposition that 
trade credit is explained by a trade-off between these two phenomena. Our 
results support the positive relation between adverse selection and trade credit 
and the negative relation between moral hazard and trade credit, the first relation 
is also consistent with asymmetric information theory. This result supports the 
agency model suggested. 
Other authors have used the adverse selection problem to explain trade 
credit, but none of them have included the moral hazard. This is the main 
contribution of our research. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the state of the art 
of the topic studied and summarizes the main theories and research on trade 
credit. Section 3 proposes an agency model and Section 4 describes the data and 
methodology used. Section 5 shows our interpretations for the results using 
univariate and multivariate tests to contrast the agency model and also test 
traditional models. In the last section we conclude and suggest some further 
research studies. 
 
2. STATE OF THE ART 
 
Trade credit is one of the oldest forms of corporate financing and it is still 
very important nowadays, it refers to financing provided by a seller to its buyer 
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(Wei and Zee, 1997). To understand the concept of trade credit it is important to 
know the range of alternative credit arrangements that can occur in trade. 
Depending on credit policy, payment can be made at different times. It can 
occur before delivery, on delivery or after delivery. In the last case, the seller 
can offer discounts for prompt payment or not, depending on trade 
arrangements. When payment does not occur before delivery or at delivery time, 
trade credit is being extended and the seller assumes the credit risk. Otherwise, 
trade credit is not being offered and the buyer assumes the risk. Figure 1 can 
better illustrate these situations. 
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Discount Taken
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Credit Period if 
Discount Taken
 
Note: Adapted from Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) 
 
Although trade credit is a very useful source of resources for different kinds of 
firms, its explanation is not very clear yet, as pointed out by Long, Malitz and Ravid 
(1993). In the last three decades, many theories and models have appeared to 
explain trade credit. Most of these theories rely on market imperfections such as the 
existence of tax, transactions costs and asymmetric information, as shown in Figure 
2. In the rest of this section we are going to detail each of those theories. 
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Figure 2.: Trade Credit Theories 
 
 
2.1. Existence of tax 
 
The decision to accept or not accept a credit depends on other possibilities 
of credit. A buyer must compare different alternatives to make sure which is the 
best choice. In trade between a seller and a buyer, a post payment can be 
offered, but it is not free, there is an implicit or an explicit interest rate included 
in the final price. Therefore, to find the best source of financing, the buyer must 
check out the real borrowing cost in other financing providers.  
Brick and Fung (1984) suggest that tax must be considered in order to 
compare trade credit cost with other alternatives of financing. The main reason 
for this is that if buyers and sellers are in different tax brackets, they have 
different borrowing costs. This is true, since interests are tax deductible. An 
argument to reinforce this idea is that by offering trade credit, sellers can offer 
discounts for cash payment that are tax deductible as well. 
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The authors’ hypothesis is that companies in a higher tax bracket tend to 
offer more credit than those in lower tax brackets; otherwise, buyers could 
borrow more cheaply directly from a financial institution and will prefer to buy 
at a lower cash price. Another conclusion is that firms allocated to a given 
industry and placed in a tax bracket below industry average cannot profit from 
offering trade credit. Brick and Fung (1984) even suggest that firms cannot both 
use and offer trade credit. 
 
2.2. Transactions Cost Theory 
 
First developed by Schwartz (1974), this theory conjectures that suppliers 
may have an advantage over traditional lenders in checking the real financial 
situation or the credit worthiness of their clients. Suppliers also have a better 
ability to monitor and force repayment of the credit. All these superiorities may 
give suppliers a cost advantage when compared with financial institutions. Three 
sources of cost advantages were cataloged by Petersen and Rajan (1997): 
advantage in information acquisition, in controlling the buyer and in salvaging 
value from existing assets. 
The first source can be justified by the fact that sellers can get information 
about buyers faster and at lower cost because it is obtained in a normal course of 
business. That is, the frequency and the amount of the buyer’s orders give 
suppliers a notion of the client’s situation; the buyer’s use of discounts for early 
payment may serve to alert the supplier of a weakening in the credit-worthiness 
of the buyer, and sellers usually visit customers more often than lenders. Smith, 
in his model (1987), concludes that in a two-part credit with high interest rate, 
those buyers that do not choose to take advantage of the discount can be 
interpreted as high risks, because they may be having financial difficulties. 
Depending on penalties for later payers, simple net terms can produce a similar 
sign. 
The second source can be seen as the power of the seller to threaten buyers. 
In other words, in some cases there are just a few alternative suppliers for the 
needed product and, consequently, buyers have very restricted choice. In this 
case, suppliers can threaten to cut off future supplies if they note a reduction in 
the chances of repayment. Compared with providers, banks and other lenders do 
not have the same threat force. This advantage can become stronger when 
buyers only represent a small part of the provider’s sales or the provider is part 
of a network and future community sanctions can be made, not only by one 
seller, but by a group, which makes this threat much stronger (Kandori, 1992). 
This hypothesis was empirically confirmed by McMillan and Woodruff (1999). 
Another interesting finding in this strand of literature was made by Petersen and 
Rajan (1997), whose empirical results suggest that debtors are less willing to 
repay a distressed seller. Their argument is that threats of cutting off future 
supplies, made by a supplier with financial problems, are not so credible. 
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The seller’s ability to salvage values from existing assets is the third source 
of cost advantages. In the case of buyer default, the seller can seize the goods 
that are supplied, of course, financial institutions can reclaim the firm’s assets as 
well. The difference between them is that as companies trading are very often 
from the same industry, the supplier already has a network to sell the goods and 
consequently repossessing and resale costs would be lower. Two interesting 
approaches related to this cost advantage were made by Mian and Smith (1992) 
and Petersen and Rajan (1997). The former posit that the more durable the 
goods, the better collateral they provide and the greater the credit offered by the 
suppliers. The latter point out that the extent to which the customers transform 
the product is also very important. The less they are transformed, the easier it 
will be for the provider to repossess and sell the asset using the same channel. 
An important reflection must be made about goods value relativeness. Ng, 
Smith and Smith (1999) consider that the value of a product is relative to 
different institutions, i.e., if a product has more value as a collateral to a seller 
than to financial institutions, the seller may have cost advantage in recuperating 
the product and selling it again. In this situation, providers tend to offer cheaper 
credit than financial institutions because of the reduction of the credit risk. 
Another study related to transaction cost theory was made by Emery 
(1987), and hypothesizes that there is a positive relation between demand 
variability and credit offered. The argument to support this idea is that as 
demand fluctuates, a company has two traditional reactions: production or price 
adjustment. The author believes that both are very costly and a better decision 
could be taken. The seller could change trade credit terms according to demand. 
Terms can be relaxed when demand drops and be tightened when demand 
increases.  In this case, trade credit can be seen as an operational tool. Long, 
Malitz and Ravid (1993) obtained empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
Their results show that firms with variable demand extend more trade credit than 
firms with stable demand. 
 
2.3. Liquidity Theory 
 
This theory suggests that credit rationed companies use more trade credit 
than those with normal access to financial intermediaries. The central point of 
this idea is that when there is a restricted monetary policy, the offer of trade 
credit can make up for the reduction of the credit offer from financial 
intermediaries. In accordance with this view, large firms, presenting good 
liquidity or better access to capital markets can finance those constrained by the 
policy. 
Many approaches have tried to obtain empirical evidence to support this 
theory. Nielsen (1999) using small firms as a proxy for credit rationed 
companies found that in monetary contraction they react by borrowing more 
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from their suppliers. As a result, trade credit tends to be less used in countries 
where companies have good relations with banks. 
As liquid firms are less likely to demand trade credit and more likely to offer 
it, a negative relation between buyer’s access to other sources of financing and 
trade credit use is expected, as Petersen and Rajan (1997) find. Another 
expected negative association, also found by these authors is between proxies 
for the strength of bank relationships and trade credit demand. 
 
2.4. Asymmetric information theory 
 
Sellers, usually, do not know the real credit-worthiness of their buyers and 
also buyers do not have knowledge about goods quality. To solve the first 
problem, Smith (1987) suggests a model where sellers offer two-part credit 
terms because they can recognize potential defaults faster than financial 
intermediaries. And, as presented in Section 2.2, there are many other arguments 
proposing that providers have costs advantages in acquiring knowledge about a 
buyer’s financial situation. But, what about the second problem? Smith also 
proposed that with asymmetric information about product quality, sellers offer 
trade credit to permit buyers to verify product quality before payment. 
The reason that leads suppliers to extend this credit is that they have an 
immense interest in a customer’s success, since they expect the client to buy 
more goods and service from them in the future. Although success of the buyer 
is important, the quality of the product sold is also crucial, and could determine 
new purchases. As a consequence, companies very often offer money-back 
guarantees as warranties as well.  
Trade credit has some advantages when compared with money-back 
guarantees and warranties. First, in a case of money-back or warranties, if the 
seller is not in business any more, the buyer can be damaged. Second, when 
payment is made at the time of sale, a client, seeking the advantages of the 
money-back system, may try to convince the seller that the quality of the 
product is not as promised. 
As pointed out by Smith (1987), one of the major proposals of trade credit 
is to allow clients to assess product quality prior to payment, although this is not 
true for some categories of product. Therefore, this theory works better in some 
industries whose product quality is unknown at the moment of purchase. If this 
idea is correct, trade credit will be higher in the trade of products where quality 
is indefinite at a prior moment and the purchase is not frequent. Otherwise, trade 
credit will be lower in trades of perishable items where acquisition is very 
frequent. 
Many researchers have studied trade credit from this point of view, see for 
instance: Lee and Stowe (1993), Long Malitz and Ravid (1993), Deloof and 
Jegers (1996) and Wei and Zee (1997). In general, the main results of these 
authors are: i) Small firms tend to offer more trade credit than large firms, since 
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small firms still have to establish their reputation about product quality. ii) Firms 
with longer production cycles prolong their collection period, since they produce 
high-quality goods. iii) Firms selling products whose quality is difficult to 
measure extend long credit periods because customers must have enough time to 
assess quality. iv) Sellers of low quality goods may try to pass them off as high-
quality goods. In this case, as the cost of extending trade credit increases, these 
companies will have less incentive to cheat on the information on quality. 
 
2.5. What these models do not explain or why models are not complete 
 
Although many theories have attempted, through different ways, to explain 
the existence of trade credit, they cannot provide a complete explanation of the 
topic. While some of the models are more consistent with the case of certain 
industries or categories of products others work better in a financially 
constrained environment. According to Frank and Maksimovic (1998) “the 
existing theories show effects that may be important in specific circumstances, 
but they do not capture what seems to be central for explaining the wide-spread 
use of trade credit and the empirical patterns of its use”. Let us check theory by 
theory and identify some inconsistencies or situations not very well explained. 
Tax theory suggests that companies in high tax brackets tend to offer credit 
to those in low tax brackets. Many research studies have found empirical 
evidence to support this, but this explanation does not seem to be enough since it 
can not explain trade credit between companies situated in the same tax bracket. 
If trade credit is an operational tool and exists to minimize transaction costs 
as in Ferris (1981), a reduction in the level of trade credit use would be expected 
since many improvements in transaction technologies have taken place. This 
reduction has not been observed.  
Liquidity theory supposes that more constrained companies use more trade 
credit than those with easier access to financial intermediaries. This may be an 
explanation, but once more, does not seem to be enough since it does not explain 
why companies not financially constrained also use trade credit. 
In the presence of asymmetric information, trade credit is offered to allow 
clients to check the real quality of the goods before payment, but traditional 
models only consider this phenomenon, called adverse selection, and forget 
another one that is the risk of goods not being paid for, the moral hazard. 
 
3. AN AGENCY MODEL FOR TRADE CREDIT POLICY 
 
The theories presented above are not able to explain the central point about 
why some products and services do not have credit or should be paid in cash. 
Because of this we proposed an agency model to explain trade credit from the 
supplier’s point of view. 
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From the agency problem proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), we 
can consider the relation between a firm and its clients an agency relation from 
which two observable facts arise: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse 
selection occurs when there is ex-ante asymmetric information between 
providers and buyers. In this case, clients do not know ex-ante the characteristics 
and quality of the goods that are being acquired. As described in Section 2.4, 
this phenomenon has already been studied by other authors, but not the moral 
hazard, which consists of the possibility of the contractual relationship not being 
carried out by the client, facilitated by the ex-post asymmetric information. The 
worst consequence of this is to generate bad debts. 
The main difference between this agency model and other models that 
attempt to explain trade credit assuming the existence of asymmetric 
information is the inclusion of moral hazard. Thus we define a function to 
explain trade credit as follows: DSO=φ(ϖ,µ), where DSO is the day of sales 
outstanding, ϖ is the cost of adverse selection and µ the moral hazard. From this 
function we expect ϖ to be positively related to DSO and µ to be negatively 
related. 
We compute a proxy for days of sales outstanding (DSO) as the natural 
logarithm of the average collection period measured by accounts receivable 
divided by daily sales. 
To proxy the adverse selection phenomenon, we find some variables in the 
literature that have been used for this purpose. Representing technical industries 
we construct a dummy variable SEC which takes the value of one if the goods 
sold need a significant time to verify their quality level, and zero otherwise. To 
classify each company in our sample, we follow Titman and Wessels (1988) 
defining technical industries as those in SIC 3400-39991; we expect SEC to be 
positively related to DSO variable. To classify firms whose products are easy to 
observe (perishable), we follow Long, Malitz and Ravid (1993) and construct 
another dummy variable PER which takes the value of one if the company’s 
products are considered perishable, those in SIC code between 2000 and 2199 
(food and agricultural), and zero otherwise. We expect this variable to be 
negatively related to DSO. To proxy firm reputation we use the variable SIZE, 
measured as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets; we expect a negative 
correlation between SIZE and DSO. With the aim of proxying the fixed assets of 
the firms we calculate FIX as 1-(Fixed Assets/Total Assets). This variable has 
been used by Prowse (1990) who suggests that the greater the proportion of 
fixed assets in a firm, the smaller the asymmetric information problem, thus we 
expect it to be directly related to DSO. Another alternative proxy for the adverse 
selection is EBIT (a measure for supplier results); the bigger it is, the smaller the 
consequences of adverse selection to the buyer. The EBIT variable is calculated 
by dividing earnings before interest and taxes for total assets; this variable is 
                                                 
1 Long, Malitz and Ravid (1993) used the same classification. 
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expected to be negatively correlated to DSO. The last variable we use to proxy 
for the adverse selection is DPA2 which consists of the days to pay accounts 
receivable. This variable is used because high quality firms may increase the 
cost of trade credit by financing their purchases. The expected relation with 
DSO is positive.  
The above described adverse selection phenomenon gives rise to our first 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the presence of adverse selection the greater the 
trade credit offer. Therefore we expect days of sales outstanding to be directly 
related to days to pay accounts payable and those sectors producing high 
quality goods and inversely related to firms earnings, firm size, fixed assets and 
those sectors producing perishable goods. 
 
 As regards proxy moral hazard we suggest three different variables: VCO 
(variable cost); BDE (bad debts provision); and DEL (demand elasticity). We 
base our suggestion of those proxies on Oh (1976). In accordance with this 
author, the decision to change a current credit policy to a new one depends on 
whether the marginal profitability is greater than or equal to the associated 
marginal opportunity cost. But which benefits and costs are related to trade 
credit and must be compared? When a firm decides to extend its credit policy it 
is probably expecting a sales increase and hence will assume new costs such as 
collection costs, bad debt losses and variable costs. Thus, the credit policy 
decision involves a tradeoff between profits on the marginal credit sales and the 
marginal costs. 
According to trade credit literature, the more extensive the credit offer, the 
greater the amount of bad debt losses the seller will support. To mitigate this 
problem, companies have incentives to offer bigger cash payment discounts. 
These discounts must be attractive enough to convince even the risky buyer to 
pay sooner, because if this occurs, it may reduce the possibility of bad debt 
losses since it restricts the time available to buyers to develop more problems. 
We proxy for the bad debt using the balance data provision-other3, which 
includes provision for bad debts and losses, divided by total assets. This variable 
is expected to be negatively related to DSO.  
When trade credit is extended, if the buyer does not pay, the provider will 
support all costs generated by the new sales. Therefore, the damage caused by 
                                                 
2 We take this variable as calculated by Compustat Global Vantage as follows: accounts 
payable divided by the sum of inventories plus cost of goods sold plus depreciation and 
amortization minus the previous value for inventories minus depreciation and amortization. 
This total is divided by 360. 
3 This item also includes contingencies, provision for employee profit sharing, provision for 
fluctuation and valuation of investments, provision for foreign exchange loss and provision 
for taxes. 
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO “NUEVAS TENDENCIAS EN DIRECCIÓN DE EMPRESAS” DT 03/05 
dtecadem@eco.uva.es    www.uva.es/empresa 
 
 10
the moral hazard will be greater, since a buyer’s default is the worst 
consequence. For those reasons we expect that  the greater the variable cost, the 
more rigid the credit policy will be. To proxy for this we use the cost of goods 
sold divided by total assets. We expect VCO to be inversely related to DSO. 
The last factor we use to proxy for the moral hazard phenomenon is 
demand elasticity. According to Borde and Mcarty (1998), an early payment 
discount is actually a price reduction and if buyers are price elastic, cash 
discounts may generate greater demand for the firm’s products. Following their 
argument, and the concept of time value of money, a long period of payment can 
be considered a price reduction as well, and in this case it can generate 
aggregated demand. This revenue coming from the new clients resultant from a 
less rigid credit policy can compensate or mitigate some risks assumed by the 
provider such as the bad debts and the variable costs. Therefore, the bad 
consequences of moral hazard will decrease when a firm’s clients are demand 
elastic. We proxy for DEL using the differences between sales as a proportion of 
total assets in yeart and sales as a proportion of total assets in yeart-1, divided by 
the differences between the average collection period in yeart and average 
collection period in yeart-1. We expect DEL to be negatively related to DSO. 
Equation 1 shows our measure for the moral hazard as a function of three 
components. 
 
),,( BDEVCODELDMORALHAZAR φ=   (1) 
 
Our second hypothesis is based on the above described moral hazard 
phenomenon. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the moral hazard consequences, the shorter the 
trade credit offer will be. Thus, we expect days of sales outstanding to be 
positively related to demand elasticity and  negatively related to variable cost 
and bad debts provision. 
 
Using these two hypotheses we can test our model, suggesting that trade 
credit can be explained by an agency model considering a trade-off between 
adverse selection costs and moral hazard consequences. We can express this 
model as follow: 
 
iiiiiiiiiii DPAEBITFIXSIZEPERSECBDEVCODELDSO εββββββββββ ++++++++++= 9876543210  (2) 
 
where all the variables are displayed in Table 1. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Our sample was first composed of 348 active manufacturing companies in 
the UK (SIC 2000 through 3999) from the Compustat Global Vantage database 
for the three-year period ending in 2002. We decided to restrict our sample to 
manufacturing firms because it is in this category where trade credit is produced 
in its habitual form. To reduce the variability all variables are averaged over the 
three-year period. We excluded from our sample 9 outlying observations and 
another 45 were lost because of missing values. This reduced our sample to 294 
observations. The firms in our sample are industry dispersed, i.e., the sample 
does not appear to be more concentrated in any industry. Producers of 
perishables only represent 9% of our sample and high quality producers 
represent 44%. Table 2 shows the distribution between industries for our 
original sample. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Descriptive data for the variables used in our analysis and Pearson´s 
Correlation are in Table 3 and 4, respectively. We can see that firms in our 
sample are relatively large, with average total assets of over £1.9 million. The 
days of sales outstanding (DSO) is around 76 days and the median is 72.42 days. 
Our analyses show that firms in our sample have on average more than 
20% of their assets represented by accounts receivable. Some of them have more 
than 50% of their total assets represented by accounts receivable.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 




To contrast the two hypotheses related to our proposed agency model and 
find some evidence on trade credit theory, we will first develop a univariate test 
to compare results with those Long, Malitz and Ravid (1993) found for USA 
companies and also check the behavior of our new variables included in the 
model and then we will try to find more conclusive evidence using a 
multivariate method. In order to test traditional models we also included other 
variables. 
 
5.1. Univariate test 
 
We use a cross-sectional t-test of differences between firms with days of 
sales outstanding below the median (72.42 days) and those above the median. 
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We also use the Levene test4 to contrast the equality of the variances. Except for 
SIZE, EBIT, DPA and DEL variables, the t-test shows that, for the agency 
model proposed, all differences are significant at the 5% level or less (see Table 
5). Although the BDE variable shows significant differences between those two 
groups, results were the opposite to what was expected. That is, firms from the 
group High DSO showed greater values. Consequently, evidence is mixed to 
support hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Companies offering trade credit above the median of our sample show 
higher levels of FIX; this supports the asymmetric information proposition that 
the consequences of adverse selection are mitigated by the existence of fixed 
assets. Thus, buyers will be less affected by adverse selection costs. 
Our analyses are consistent with the findings of Long, Malitz and Ravid 
(1993). The outcomes of the two dummy variables included in t-test contrast are 
as expected. As a result, High-Tech producers usually extend more credit for 
buyers to allow them to check the real quality of the goods before payment and 
producers of perishable and easy-to-observe goods do not. 
Differences between the two groups are not significant for the variable 
EBIT, thus we do not confirm the proposed idea which suggests that the greater 
the earnings of the provider, the smaller the cost of adverse selection to the 
buyer. For the same reason, we do not confirm the supposition that large firms, 
which probably have a good reputation, extend less credit than smaller firms that 
probably have not yet built up their reputation. 
Finally, as we have projected, the variable costs present differences 
between the two groups. The VCO, one of our measurements of the moral 
hazard phenomenon, on average, is statistically different between companies 
that extend large credit terms and those that only extend short terms of credit. 
The High DSO group has smaller levels of VCO indicating that the bigger the 
variable cost, the greater the consequences of moral hazard and the shorter the 
credit terms will be. 
TD and CVS, variables included in the test in order to contrast traditional 
models, were not significant. 
According to univariate t-test results, evidence partially confirms product 
quality theory of trade credit but does not support liquidity and tax theory. 
Neither do we have enough evidence to make any inference about cost 
transaction theory. Results are also inconclusive about the relevance of the 
moral hazard influence in trade credit decision. 
  
                                                 
4 We assume equal variances for those variables with a significance value above 0.05. 
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5.2. Results of multivariate test 
 
To confirm our findings with a greater level of reliance or even to find 
more evidence to support the proposed agency theory and then confirm the 
relevance of moral hazard, we use multiple regression through the ordinary least 
square method. Table 6 shows regression results. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Our regression results present an adjusted R2 of 0.356. The picture that 
emerges from Table 6 is quite similar to the one from the univariate test, 
although there are some differences. The principal difference is that by using the 
multivariate test SIZE, EBIT, DPA and the DEL variables are now significant. 
Those differences give more support to our proposed agency model. 
The negative and significant relation between SIZE and DSO supports the 
asymmetric information theory based on product quality guarantee argument 
and is not consistent with liquidity theory which proposes that firms of known 
liquidity, with large access to the financial market, should extend trade credit to 
those more constrained. Instead, we find that smaller companies, with their 
reputation not yet constructed, extend larger trade credit to allow clients to 
check product quality and then build their status as high quality firms. 
Once more supporting the asymmetric information theory, the variable FIX 
shows a positive relation with DSO. According to the construction of the 
variable, the greater its value, the smaller the proportion of fixed assets for a 
company. Thus, trade relations between buyers and providers with a high 
proportion of fixed assets present smaller problems of adverse selection. 
The results for the SIC dummy variable are also as expected. Firms 
categorized as high quality producers extend more credit than those categorized 
as low quality producers. Therefore, companies whose products are considered 
high quality offer a period of credit great enough to permit their clients to check 
the real quality of goods before payment.  
The PER dummy variable, as predicted, is negatively related to DSO. 
Again, results are consistent with product quality theory. Therefore, firms whose 
products are classified as easy-to-observe quality (perishable goods) offer 
shorter terms of credit than others. 
Contrary to the results for the univariate test, the EBIT variable is now 
significant showing the expected relation with DSO. The more firms earn the 
shorter is the credit offered. These results confirm our evidence supporting the 
product quality argument that the greater the seller’s earnings, the weaker the 
consequences of adverse selection to buyers. 
Analyzing the same EBIT coefficient we do not find support to accept 
liquidity and tax theory. According to liquidity theory, firms presenting a 
comfortable financial situation offer credit to those presenting an opposite 
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situation. We understand that highly profitable companies have a good financial 
situation and our results show evidence supporting a negative, not a positive 
relation, between EBIT and DSO. To reject the tax hypothesis we must interpret 
Brick and Fung’s (1984) proposition that companies in higher tax brackets offer 
credit to those in lower tax brackets. Otherwise, buyers could borrow with a 
lower after-tax cost than sellers and then, buy cash. This argument works only in 
the case of the existence of seller earnings, because this ensures a smaller after-
tax cost for the debt. As our results show that the greater the EBIT the shorter 
the DSO variable, we have evidence to reject the tax proposition. 
Although EBIT and SIZE results are not consistent with liquidity theory, 
outcome for the DPA variable is consistent with liquidity theory, because it 
predicts that credit offer is inverse-related to credit used. If the main argument of 
the liquidity theory is that companies offer trade credit because they have wide 
access to the financial market and at a lower cost, they should not need to use 
trade credit. Therefore, trade credit extended and trade credit used are mutually 
exclusive. 
According to our findings, the greater the demand elasticity, the smaller the 
consequences of the moral hazard borne by the provider and the less risky will 
be the trade credit offered by a firm. Thus, firms with a high level of demand 
elasticity will extend more trade credit. 
Regression results are in accordance with the arguments presented in 
Section 3, which predict that the variable costs negatively influence the length of 
the trade credit. Thus, sellers with a high level of variable costs will be more 
strongly affected in case of buyer default than those with lower levels and 
consequently will extend less credit. 
The unexpected results for the BDE variable may be related to the poor 
liquidity situation of risk clients. According to our previous argument, firms 
whose clients are considered “high risk”, i.e. presenting high levels of BDE, 
should raise cash discounts offered to attract risk clients to pay soon and thus 
avoid bad debts. Unfortunately, these risk clients, probably because of their 
insolvency situation, can not make use of discounts offered and then pay the 
total value on the net date. To solve this problem we run another regression to 
check if there is a determinate level of bad debts that make trade credit offered 
show a different sign. 
To run this regression we constructed a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if a company is placed above the 66.66 percentile for the BDE 
variable and zero otherwise. The new model is expressed as follow: 
 
 tiiiii BDEBDEVCODELDSO εβββββ +++++= 243210     (3) 
 
where BDE2 is the BDE variable multiplied by the dummy variable constructed. 
Results are reported in Table 7. 
 
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO “NUEVAS TENDENCIAS EN DIRECCIÓN DE EMPRESAS” DT 03/05 
dtecadem@eco.uva.es    www.uva.es/empresa 
 
 15
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Our results can now confirm hypothesis 2 that BDE and DSO are inversely 
related. We even find evidence to support our previous supposition that when 
clients present a very high level of risk, seller’s efforts to diminish the average 
collection period are never enough and in this case a positive relation between 
trade credit and bad debts arises. For the other variables representing the moral 
hazard, coefficients keep their expected sign and significance.  
 Overall, our results totally confirm the product quality guarantee argument 
and consequently the positive influence of the adverse selection phenomenon on 
trade credit offered and also confirm the moral hazard argument. Therefore, we 
confirm hypothesis 1, except for the DPA variable, and even confirm hypothesis 
2. We also find evidence to reject tax theory and mixed results for the liquidity 
theory.  
 
5.3. Testing traditional models 
 
To strengthen our findings regarding traditional theories and also to 
compare our findings using the agency model proposed, we run five more 
regressions. 
To test the tax theory, which predicts that sellers offer trade credit because 
they have access to funds at a lower after-tax cost than buyers, we use TD, a 
measurement for total debt. If sellers have a high level of debt, they are less 
likely to obtain another loan with tax deductible interest and thus reduce its 
borrowing cost. TD is the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities as 
a percentage of total asset averaged over the three year period. We expect TD to 
be negatively related to DSO. We also use EBIT as an independent variable 
since if a seller does not show earnings its tax will not be deductible. Equation 4 
shows the tax model and the results are reported in Table 8. 
 
iiii TDEBITDSO εβββ +++= 210        (4) 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Although this model only shows an adjusted R2 of 0.014 and the result for 
the EBIT variable is not significant, its outcome shows that the coefficient for 
the TD variable is significant at 5% level, thus supporting the argument that 
companies showing high levels of debt tend to offer less credit. As a 
consequence, this result supports the tax theory.  
Liquidity theory is tested using a model composed of three explicative 
variables: SIZE, EBIT and DPA. Equation 5 shows this model. 
 
iiiii DPAEBITSIZEDSO εββββ ++++= 3210                                                          (5) 
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As this theory suggest that firms with wider access to the financial market 
and showing more liquidity tend to extend credit to those with restricted access 
to the financial market and also predicts that firms will either purchase on credit 
or sell on credit, but not both, DSO is expected to be directly related to SIZE and 
EBIT and inversely related to DPA. Results are reported in Table 9. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Results for this test offer mixed support for the liquidity theory. As the 
result shows, on the one hand, the coefficient for EBIT is not significant and for 
SIZE it shows a negative sign, which does not support the liquidity theory but 
gives support to the product quality argument of the asymmetric information 
theory. On the other hand, the coefficient for the DPA variable is negative as 
predicted by the theory. Therefore firms tend to offer trade credit or buy on 
credit but not both and large firms tend to extend less credit than small firms.  
To test the operational argument of transactional cost theory we regress the 
DSO using as an explanatory variable the CVS (coefficient of variation of 
sales). This theory predicts that trade credit is important only when demand 
variability exists. CVS is calculated as the standard deviation of total revenue 
over the four year period ending in 2002. We expect DSO to be positively 
related to CVS. The transaction cost model is shown in equation 6 and the 
results are given in Table 10. 
 
iii CVSDSO εββ ++= 10                                                                                       
(6) 
 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The regression result for this model shows that CVS is negatively related to 
DSO. This relation does not support the operational argument of the cost 
transaction theory that trade credit is important only when demand fluctuates. 
To test the asymmetric information theory based on the argument that as 
clients do not know ex-ante goods quality and thus trade credit must be offered 
to allow them to check product quality before payment, we regress DSO using 
all those variables used in the agency model to proxy the adverse selection 
phenomenon without including those variables used to proxy the moral hazard. 
Equation 7 shows the regression model and Table 11 reports our results. 
 
iiiiiiii DPAEBITFIXSIZEPERSECDSO εβββββββ +++++++= 6543210                    (7) 
 
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
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Except for SIZE and DPA, the results for all the variables included in the 
model support the product quality guarantee argument. Thereby, firms from very 
specific industries that produce high quality goods tend to offer more credit than 
those from industries of perishable goods. Also, small firms and those 
presenting a small proportion of fixed assets in their balance sheets tend to offer 
more credit than larger firms with high proportion of fixed assets. Results for 
these variables are very similar to those already found in our agency model. 
As these test shows, although some of these models were supported while 
others were not or have presented only mixed support, their explanatory power 
was not as strong as the agency model proposed. While the agency model 
presents an adjusted R2 of 0.356, the traditional model with the higher adjusted 
R2 was the one testing the asymmetric information theory with the value of 
0.224. Thereby we run one last regression including all the variables used in 
these traditional models to compare results against the agency model. Equation 8 
shows the regression model and Table 12 reports the result. 
 
iiiiiiiiii TDCVSDPAEBITFIXSIZEPERSECDSO εβββββββββ +++++++++= 876543210 (8) 
 
[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Especially in three points, the results reported in Table 12 lead us to the 
same conclusions we already have. First, the agency model can explain more 
than other traditional models, since again the adjusted R2 is not as great as that 
presented in Table 6. Second, evidence again supports the asymmetric 
information theory. Third, again the liquidity theory only has weak support. 
The main difference between this test and those testing each theory 
separately changes the conclusion about tax theory. If when we tested the tax 
theory, the TD variable was negatively related to DSO as expected, in this 
regression it is not significant even at a level of 10%. Therefore, these new 




This paper proposes an agency model to explain trade credit offered. Based 
on the agency problem suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), we consider 
that in a relation between a seller and a buyer two phenomena are observable: 
adverse selection and moral hazard. The former exists when, because of 
asymmetric information, buyers do not know ex-ante characteristics or quality 
of the product being acquired. The latter is the possibility of the contractual 
relationship not being carried out and the worst consequence is the appearance 
of bad debts. This paper also checks some traditional theories such as liquidity, 
tax and transaction cost. To contrast these models a sample of UK 
manufacturing companies is used. 
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According to the results, traditional models such as liquidity, tax and 
transaction cost do not offer a complete explanation for the trade credit 
extended. We did not find evidence to support tax and transaction cost theories. 
For the liquidity theory, results were only mixed. The product quality argument 
is valid but not sufficient and the moral hazard phenomenon is useful to 
complement the model. Therefore, our agency model based on a trade off 
between adverse selection and moral hazard offers a better explanation since it 
considers aspects related to trade credit risk such as the variable cost assumed by 
the provider, the demand elasticity and bad debts. 
Our model suggests and finds evidence that high quality, smaller and less 
profitable firms, which have less fixed assets, are more likely to extend credit 
because their relationship with clients presents more adverse selection problems. 
We also find that firms with high levels of variable cost and low levels of 
demand elasticity extend less credit because they support higher levels of moral 
hazard consequences. 
We also found evidence that the greater the bad debts for a company the 
shorter the average collection period will be. This occurs because sellers tend to 
offer more attractive discounts for cash payments or will reduce credit terms 
when clients’ risk increases. Furthermore, we also found evidence that when bad 
debts are very high, sellers’ efforts to diminish the average collection period and 
trade risk are never sufficient, since their clients probably do not present 
sufficient liquidity to take advantage of cash discounts or to pay up to date. 
 Concluding, as adverse selection is already a recognized phenomenon 
related to trade credit, moral hazard has just started to be such. Thus, further 
research can be carried out to reinforce this model. Better proxies for moral 
hazard can be established for the future and research from the buyer’s point of 
view should be done in order to contrast these ideas, since buyers’ risk is easy to 
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Table 1: Expected Sign 
Phenomenon Variables Expected Sign 
Adverse Selection SEC + 
Adverse Selection PER - 
Adverse Selection SIZE - 
Adverse Selection FIX + 
Adverse Selection EBIT - 
Adverse Selection DPA + 
Moral Hazard DEL + 
Moral Hazard VCO - 
Moral Hazard BDE - 
 
Table 2: Industry Distribution 
Sic INDUSTRY Nº. % 
20 Food and Kindred Products 29 8% 
21 Tobacco Products 3 1% 
22 Textile Mill Products 11 3% 
23 
Apparel and Other Finished Products Made from Fabrics and 
Similar Materials 13 4% 
25 Furniture and Fixtures 7 2% 
26 Paper and Allied Products 11 3% 
27 Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 27 8% 
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 45 13%
29 Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 3 1% 
30 Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 12 3% 
31 Leather and Leather Products 3 1% 
32 Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 21 6% 
33 Primary Metal Industries 11 3% 
34 
Manufactured Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transport 
Equipment 10 3% 
35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 30 9% 
36 
Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, 
Except Computer Equipment 50 14%
37 Transport Equipment 19 6% 
38 
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments; 
Photographic, Medical and Optical Goods; Watches and Clocks 32 9% 
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 11 3% 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 DSO SIZE EBIT FIX VCO DEL BDESECPER DPA TD CVS ACCTS
N 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294 294
Average 76,76 1804,91 155,84 ,39 ,72 -,06 ,02 ,46 ,08 431,03 ,23 ,27 ,21
Stand. Dev.. 35,40 9598,38 1116,92 ,85 1,07 ,53 ,02 ,50 ,27 2789,03 ,29 1,32 ,10
Minimum 8,17 ,19 -3030,25-13,01 ,00-4,80 ,00 ,00 ,00 ,12 ,00 ,01 ,01
Median 72,42 113,55 4,80 ,47 ,62 -,01 ,00 ,00 ,00 62,79 ,19 ,14 ,20
Maximum 295,14 148073,67 15439,00 1,0016,68 4,33 ,14 1,00 1,0042267,834,21 22,54 ,53
Notes:  
DSO stands for the days of sales outstanding averaged over the three-year period. 
SIZE represents the three-year period average of firms total assets . 
EBIT represents the three-year period average of firms EBIT. 
FIX is the fixed assets proportion on firms total assets averaged for the three-year period. 
VCO represents the three-year period average for cost of goods sold divided by total assets. 
DEL stands for the three-year period average for the differences between sales as a proportion of total assets in 
year x and sales as a proportion of total assets in year x-1, divided by the differences between average collection 
period in year x and average collection period in year x-1. 
BDE is the three-year period average of the data provision-other divided by total assets. 
SEC is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if goods sold need a significant time to verify their quality 
and zero otherwise. 
PER stands for a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if goods sold are perishable or easy to observe 
quality and zero otherwise. 
DPA represents the days to pay accounts payable averaged over the three-year period. 
TD represents the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities as percentage of total asset averaged over 
the three year period. 
CVS is the standard deviation of total revenue over the four year period ending in 2002. 
ACCTS stands for the accounts receivable as a proportion of total asset averaged over the three year period. 
 
Table 4: Pearson´s Correlation 
 LNDSO DEL VCO BDE SEC PER SIZE FIX EBIT DPA
LNDSO Pearson´s Correlation 1 ,190 -,236 ,126 ,276 -,367 -,153 ,181 ,028 -,134
 Sig. (2-tailed) , ,001 ,000 ,031 ,000 ,000 ,008 ,002 ,636 ,022
DEL Pearson´s Correlation ,190 1 -,300 ,016 ,144 ,030 ,090 ,233 ,242 ,012
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 , ,000 ,787 ,013 ,607 ,122 ,000 ,000 ,842
VCO Pearson´s Correlation -,236 -,300 1 -,026 -,072 -,038 -,262 -,833 -,837 -,092
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 , ,663 ,221 ,516 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,117
BDE Pearson´s Correlation ,126 ,016 -,026 1 ,149 -,129 ,327 ,056 ,022 ,037
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,031 ,787 ,663 , ,010 ,027 ,000 ,335 ,713 ,529
SEC Pearson´s Correlation ,276 ,144 -,072 ,149 1 -,267 -,121 ,146 ,041 ,017
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,013 ,221 ,010 , ,000 ,037 ,013 ,481 ,776
PER Pearson´s Correlation -,367 ,030 -,038 -,129 -,267 1 ,186 -,047 ,047 ,112
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,607 ,516 ,027 ,000 , ,001 ,426 ,423 ,054
SIZE Pearson´s Correlation -,153 ,090 -,262 ,327 -,121 ,186 1 ,201 ,265 ,127
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,008 ,122 ,000 ,000 ,037 ,001 , ,001 ,000 ,029
FIX Pearson´s Correlation ,181 ,233 -,833 ,056 ,146 -,047 ,201 1 ,880 -,012
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,002 ,000 ,000 ,335 ,013 ,426 ,001 , ,000 ,835
EBIT Pearson´s Correlation ,028 ,242 -,837 ,022 ,041 ,047 ,265 ,880 1 ,015
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,636 ,000 ,000 ,713 ,481 ,423 ,000 ,000 , ,797
DPA Pearson´s Correlation -,134 ,012 -,092 ,037 ,017 ,112 ,127 -,012 ,015 1
 Sig. (2-tailed) ,022 ,842 ,117 ,529 ,776 ,054 ,029 ,835 ,797 ,
Notes: 
**  Significant at the 0.01 level (bilateral). 
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Table 5: Test of independent samples 
Variables Low DSO High DSO T-Statistic of Difference 
SIZE 5,2668 4,9155 -1,524 
FIX ,2907 ,4960 2,075** 
EBIT -,0745 -,0700 ,036 
SEC ,36 ,55 3,218*** 
PER ,14 ,01 -4,251*** 
VCO ,9136 ,5375 -3,049*** 
DEL -,0966 -,0308 1,059 
BDE ,0116 ,0191 2,707*** 
DPA 636,9437 227,8906 -1,251 
TD ,2385 ,2142 -,719 
CVS ,3349 ,2085 -,821 
Notes:  
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
a Low DSO is defined as DSO less than the median of 72.42 days. 






Table 6: Multivariate Tests of the Agency Model 











   
Adjusted R square: 0.356  
F-Statistic: 19.024  
Notes:  
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 7: Multivariate Tests of the Moral Hazard 







Adjusted R square: 0.085  
F-Statistic: 7.829  
Notes:  
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 




Table 8: Multivariate Tests of the Tax Theory 




   
Adjusted R square: 0.014  
F-Statistic: 3.014  
Notes:  
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 




Table 9: Multivariate Tests of the Liquidity Theory 






Adjusted R square: 0.032  
F-Statistic: 4.188  
Notes:  
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 10: Multivariate Tests of the Transaction Costs Theory 




Adjusted R square: 0.008  
F-Statistic: 3.368  
Notes:  
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
Table 11: Multivariate Tests of the Asymmetric Information Theory 









Adjusted R square: 0.224  
F-Statistic: 15.059  
Notes:  
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
Table 12: Multivariate Tests of the Asymmetric Information, Transaction 
Costs, Liquidity and Tax Theories. 











Adjusted R square: 0.275  
F-Statistic: 14.889  
Notes:  
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO “NUEVAS TENDENCIAS EN DIRECCIÓN DE EMPRESAS” DT 03/05 
dtecadem@eco.uva.es    www.uva.es/empresa 
 
